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American Foreign Policy in the Third World 
New World Order, Rhetoric or Reality7
James Alexander
Embodying an absolute moral ethos Americanism once it is driven onto the world stage by 
events is inspired willy mlly to reconstruct the very alien things it tries to avoid Its messiamsm is 
the polar counterpoint of its isolationism An absolute national morality is inspired either to 
withdraw from alien things or to transform them it cannot live in comfort constantly by their s ide1
Writing in 1955 Louis Hartz argued that American foreign policy was constrained by its history Coupled with 
its isolationist past, America s unique historical background engendered the formation of a liberal absolutism 
that was not adaptable to the outside world Yet, as Hartz argued, when acting in an international role the 
United States still tned to push its ideals Hartz believed however that
America must look to its contact with other nauons to provide that spark of philosophy that grain 
of relative insight that its own history has denied it
What is at stake is nothing less than a new level of consciousness a transcending of irrational 
Lockianism m which an understanding of self and an understanding of others go hand in hand 2
Writing at the height of the Cold War Hartz primary concerns included the United States competition with the 
Soviet Union—a competition that Hartz believed required the United States to adapt its ideals to the realities of 
the world if it was to compete effectively
Looking back from the present we can ask whether the United States has learned the lessons that Hartz 
prescribed The answer to such a question is a non-committal maybe” As will be discussed below the New 
World Order” rhetoric expressed by President George Bush exhibits either or both sides of the argument During 
the Cold War the Soviet American competition for the allegiance of the Third World was acute The 
competition required both sides to make numerous compromises of their ideals in order to achieve influence m 
disparate regions Yet, with the decime of the Cold War and the accompanying disappearance of the Soviet 
threat, American foreign policy makers have a great deal more flexibility m crafting United States political and 
economic policies m the Third World The Bush Administration has taken advantage of that flexibility
In attempting to define Bush s conception of the New World Order in the Third World it must be noted that 
many analysts are extremely skeptical of finding anything of substance in the body of rhetoric They argue that 
the decline of the Cold War gives Bush a unique opportunity to mold American policy for the 1990s and 
beyond To do so Bush needs a strategy (or vision) for that future instead what emerges are compromises m 
foreign policy that lack the necessary leadership to take advantage of revolutionary times 3 The primary purpose 
of this article is not to judge whether or not current American policy in the Third World is proceeding m the 
nght direction rather it is to identify whether or not Bush s New World Order” rhetoric has substance or even a 
vision for the future And regardless of one s political views current American foreign policy in these regions 
exhibits both of these qualities
Above all else Bush has shown a commitment to constructing and following international legal norms 
This commitment was first expressed in the United States strict adherence to United Nauons resolutions during 
the Gulf War Closely tied to international legal norms Bush is striving for a certain uniformity in 
international relations This is a rather vague approach to achieving a common rationality through compromise
* Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1955) p 286
2 Ibid  pp 287 308
3 Terry L Diebel Bush s Foreign Policy Mastery and Inaction Foreign Policy no 84 (Fall 1991) p 3 See also Michael
Mandelbaum The Bush Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs voi 70 no 1 (1990/91) pp 5 22 Published nine months before 
the Diebel Piece Mandelbaum s article presented an almost identical argument
2among nations a sort of businessman s” attempt to begin negotiations with a clean slate This process was 
most apparent m the preparatory period for the Middle East Peace Conference held in October 1991 in Madrid
Yet while aspects of Bush s foreign policy might have achieved the new level of consciousness that 
Hartz recommended the framework in which they have been expressed may just be further examples of 
America s manifest destiny” for the world 4 While Bush denies a vision of Pax Americana the overall strategy 
of American policy in the Thud World shows otherwise When Hartz wrote a coherent strategy to export 
Americanism” was doomed to failure However the recent decline of the Soviet Umon makes the success of 
such policies more probable Events prompted one member of the Soviet military to write of Bush s goals 
The United States is the only superpower and it is predestined by fate itself to rule the world. And 
it at once becomes obvious that the new concept is not actually that new It is a question of the same 
old Pax Americana 5
Given such reactions to U S policy it is important to understand what is truly behind the concept New 
World Order ” Largely based on an indepth survey of official speeches and press conferences published in the 
New York Times covering the penod from Bush s inauguration until the present, this paper will attempt to 
flesh out Bush s conception of American policy m the Third World. It will examine Bush s foreign policy in 
three periods 1) from President Bush s inauguration until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when policy m the 
Third World lacked a clear focus 2) the penod of the Gulf Crisis when Bush s concepuon of a *New World 
Order emerged and 3) changing patterns of U S behavior in the post ensis penod with special attention given 
to the correlation between policy and rhetonc
While the decline of the Soviet Bloc was the most significant event leading to a change m Amencan Third 
World policy initial implications of this event were unclear The first real evidence of the changing quality of 
relations arose with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait In recognizing this change this paper employs a loose ex 
post facto  time senes design In this design Bush s rhetonc during the Persian Gulf Crisis acts as a treatment 
which qualitatively separates post-ensis U S foreign policy in the Thud World from pre-cnsis policy Yet, as 
will become clear there is no decisive separating point Rather the pre crisis penod exhibits aspects of New 
World Order policy which are also evident in the post ensis policy while the post ensis era exhibits aspects of 
foreign policy which have long been exhibited in United States foreign affairs
The Pre War Penod Begging Unity
Though policy changed throughout 1990 for the most part pre ensis Bush foreign policy did not exhibit 
uniformity and consistency Compansons of Amencan foreign policy in the Middle East, Latin Amenca and 
Asia exhibited striking differences 6 United States policy demonstrated a reactive quality which clearly identified 
the level of Amencan influence from region to region This meant policies of persuasion m the Middle East, of 
domination m Latin Amenca, of mediation and flexibility in Asia and disinterest in Sub-Saharan Afnca As for 
incongruities within regions they pnmanly took place where the United States had its greatest influence Latin 
Amenca. Across all regions however Bush s foreign policy exhibited aspects of post-crisis policy an appeal 
to law a recognition of an expanding role for international organizations and of regional uniformities and the 
call for democratic and economic reform What these disconnected elements lacked that appears m the post crisis 
era was a unified strategy for their achievement and a vision of the future The present section of this paper 
examines the disparate policies by region just as it appears U S foreign policy was also organized
4  As Hartz has pointed out the moral conviction of us political economic and cultural superiority has long been a part of U S
foreign policy Often referred to as Wilsonian (after President Woodrow Wilson) these convicuons have been clearly evident 
since the early 20th century For a bnef examination of Wilson s moralism in U S foreign policy see Part VI of E David 
Cronor Ed The Political Thought o f Woodrow Wilson (Indianapolis The Bobbs Merrill Company Inc 1965)
5 M Ponomarev “Bush s NWO Seen as Old Idea Foreign Broadcast Information Service May 21 1991 p 13 from Krasnaia
zvezda May 17 1991 p 3
® As compared to other regions other than sporadic initiatives Sub Saharan Afnca has not played anb important part in Amencan 
policy Therefore other than a few references Amencan policy in this region will not be highlighted.
The Middle East
In this region the Bush administration focused primarily on the Arab Israeli conflict As has been the case after 
the Gulf War Secretary of State Baker attempted to lay the groundwork for a peace conference The preliminary 
goal was the achievement of a tentative uniformity of percepuons between Palestinians and Israelis before 
negotiations could start American policy exhibited the belief that only through compromise could the 
foundations be laid for an international conference 2 While compromise had already been a component of 
American policy m the region support for Israel was slipping as other actors were mcluded m the peace process 
Baker told the American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAQ that peace required a halt to Israeli 
discussion of a greater” Israel which would anse through the annexation of the occupied territories Baker 
linked peace negotiations to a halt m the settlement of these temtones and an Israeli commitment to open 
schools as part of recognizing Palestinian political nghts 8
The changing United States perceptions of Arab-Israeli relations mcluded the requirement that the 
Palestinians (though not the Palestine Liberation Organization) participate in the negotiations In striving to 
build a foundation that included the Palestinians Baker also made it clear that the United States did not support 
the PX O On an issue that arose twice in 1989 the United States threatened to cut off funds to any United 
Nation s agencies considering recognizing the P L O as more than just an observer organization Baker argued 
in legal terms that recognition cannot be granted unilaterally it must proceed through negotiation 9 
Eventually the United States suspended its dialogue with the PX O following the latter s refusal to condemn a 
May 1990 attack on Israel by one of its splinter organizations 10
The primary reason behind the suspension of dialogue is ultimately reduced to the issue of terrorism 
Terrorists or groups that do not condemn them are not recognized by the Bush administration Such has been 
the driving issue behind President Bush s rhetoric toward Iran After the Ayatollah Khomeini s death m 1989 
Bush linked improvement m bilateral relations to Iranian renunciation of tenror and a demonstrated effort to 
facilitate the release of American hostages 11 Yet, his policy has been somewhat inconsistent m this area. 
Though there was no evidence of movement on the hostage issue the United States began the process of 
returning Iranian assets in November 198912 Thus m the pre cnsis penod it was difficult to know when 
morals or some form of realpolitik was guiding policy In the post-crisis era, however the two often signify 
the same thing
Latin America
The spread of democracy has been the primary focus of Bush Administration policy in Latin America The two 
major areas of attention in the pre-cnsis era were Panama and Nicaragua. While policy m the Middle East and 
Asia largely focused on diplomatically encouraging an environment for future elections m the cases of 
Nicaragua and Panama, U S policy still mcluded direct intervention In Nicaragua continued economic 
sanctions were coupled with financial support not only for the Contras but for the internal opposition as well 
In Panama, initial hopes were that General Manuel Noriega would be removed through the electoral process
^ Thomas L Friedman "P L O and Israel to Get Bush Ideas on Mid East Peace " New York Tunes March 
12 1989 p 1
0 James Baker "Excerpts From Baker s Mideast Talk " New York Times May 23 1989 p 10 The
settlement issue has persisted and has become the ultimate obstacle to the success of the Middle 
East peace talks begun in October 1991 in Madrid
9 Robert Pear "Baker Would Ask Cutoff of Funds if U N Agencies Upgrade P L 0 " New York Times May 
2 1989 p 12 and Paul Lewis "U S May Cut Dues to U N Over Arab Resolutions * New York 
Times November 26 1989 p 12
George Bush "Excerpts From President s News Conference on the P L 0 and Other Issues " New York 
Times June 21 1990 p 10
Ü  George Bush "President s News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issues " New York Times June 9 
1989 p 22
1 o George Bush "Excerpts From the President s News Conference " New York Times November 8 1989 p
4Following fraudulent elections the evolution of American policy culminated m the invasion of December 1989 
American intolerance for the governments m power was the common factor influencing policy toward these two 
countries If fair” elections could not be achieved naturally the United States intervened to direct the 
democratic process
The fraudulent May 1989 Panamanian election led to swift U S condemnation the institution of economic 
sanctions and President Bush s calls for the popular overthrow of Nonega The failure to achieve Noriega s 
overthrow led to military intervention After the December 1989 invasion Bush justified the use of American 
forces while also claiming international support^  Yet, as Bush eventually admitted, this support had not been 
readily forthcoming from Latin American states which have long been wary of United States intervention m the 
region 14 In making a plea to international law Secretary of State Baker farther justified the action on the basis 
of Article 51 of the U.N Charta’ and Article 21 of the Organization of American States (O A S ) Charter15 
When faced with international criticism President Bush defended the use of force [The] U S used its resources 
m a manner consistent with political diplomatic and moral principles ”16 For several reasons which will be 
discussed below these same principles were to be applied in a manner that was internationally acceptable m the 
Persian Gulf Cnsis
Bush s policy in Nicaragua was built on a more solid foundation Early in the process Secretary of State 
Baker called for multilateral cooperation among the Latin American countries17 Yet contradictions m policy 
were evident Only a month earlier these same countries questioned whether proposed U S aid to the Contras 
violated the regional peace agreement calling for their disbandment1^  Baker raised the classic American paradox 
m Latin America the desire for multilateral policy if it served U S interests coupled with the intention to 
carry out unilateral action if the situation was deemed to ment such action The policy that was followed in 
Nicaragua did not raise strong protest from the countnes of the region nor was it as intrusive as the Panamanian 
invasion Yet, the United States provision of special campaign funds earmarked for opposition candidates was 
only a less direct way of setting” policy m its sphere of mterest *9 Furthermore by not rescinding U S 
economic sanctions until a f ta  the February 1990 election Bush s policy offered the Nicaraguan voter a choice 
between continued economic hardship under the Sandinistas and the possibility of improvement under the 
opposition candidate Violeta Chamorro
The Bush policy in the cases of Nicaragua and Panama was to ensure a democratically elected government 
To achieve this goal the administration strategy was initially minimalist in Panama and Nicaragua let the 
democratic process flow naturally Yet undesirable results and/or unfavorable projections resulted m increased 
U S involvement in order to achieve the ultimate goal democracy In reaction to initial success Bush
^  George Bush "A Transcript of Bush s Address on the Decision to use Force in Panama " New York 
Times December 21 1991 p 19 The four points of justification were (1) the safety of 
American lives (2) the defense of Panamanian democracy (3) combatting drug traffic and (4) the 
protection of the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty
14 George Bush "Transcript of Bush News Conference on Noriega and Panama * New York Times January 
6 1990 p 10
^  James Baker "Excerpts From Statement by Baker on Ü S Policy " New York Times December 21 1989
p 19 Both of these Articles provide justification for the use of force in the case of self- 
defense In this case Bush claimed to be protecting the lives of Americans still in Panama 
For texts of both charters see Edmund Jan Osmanczyk The E n cyclo p ed ia  o f  The U n ited  N a tio n s  and 
I n te r n a t io n a l  R e la t io n s (New York Taylor and Francis 1990)
^  George Bush "Text of Bush Announcement on the General s Surrender " New York Times January 4 
1990 p 12
17 Thomas L Friedman "U S Asks Venezuela to put Pressure on the Sandimstas * New York Times 
March 31 1989
^  James Baker "Baker Plea for Interim Contra Aid Evokes the Skepticism of Congress " New York 
Times March 4 1989 p 1
Robert Pear "U S Revises Plan to Aid Opposition in Nicaragua Vote w New York Times September 
22 1989 p 1
employed economic aid mstrumentally to keep the two countries on the correct path The aid was earmarked to 
(1) help build democracy (2) to spark economic development, and (3) to demilitarize the national forces 20
El Salvador and regional trade relations were the other two major foci of U S policy in Latin America 
Two separate events m El Salvador exemplified America s historical willingness to tolerate authoritarian 
regimes which it can dominate First, President Bush continued to fund the Cristiani government even as 
human rights abuses received unwanted publicity 21 Second, Bush unilaterally sent U S forces to El Salvador 
to rescue Am encan hostages Without requesting the consent of Cnstiam Bush told him what we were going 
to do and he acquiesced 22” In regional trade the Bush administration announced proposals to expand relations m 
Latin America. In general the policies were employed as instruments intended to achieve political and economic 
reform m the relevant countnes The proposals included a free trade pact with the Mexican government, trade 
initiatives as alternatives to drug trafficking in several of the Andean countnes sanctions on countnes which 
were not cooperating in fighting drug production and debt relief as a result of aid transfers to Eastern Europe 23
Asia
Reflecting its less powerful position in Asia, U S policy was more flexible than m Latin Amenca.
Negotiations to end the crisis in Cambodia dominated U S participation m the region Even before Bush s 
inauguration Baker set two goals for this process Vietnamese withdrawal and bamng a return to power of the 
Khmer Rouge 24 While Bush initially provided aid to the non-communist rebels under the leadership of Pnnce 
Sihanouk, congressional fears of the Khmer Rouge caused a policy shift The shift toward relations with the 
Vietnamese backed government was conditioned on the guarantee that any future coalition government would 
reserve power for Sihanouk 23 In Afghanistan United States policy was also flexible Becoming less bellicose 
in its call for the overthrow of the formerly Soviet backed Najibullah government, U S policy began to focus 
on the possibilities for a negotiated settlement and popular elections 26 Finally feanng Pakistani nuclear 
development, Bush tried to slow down the Pakistan India arms race by requesting that then Prime Minister of 
India Rajiv Ghandi speak to then Pakistani leader Benazir Bhutto As part of U S policy against nuclear 
proliferation U S  aid is dependent on the presidents ability to certify that Pakistan neither has the bomb nor is
George Bush "Excerpts From President s News Session on Foreign and Domestic Issues " New York 
Times March 14 1990 p 14
21 Maureen Dowd "Bush Seeks a Rise in Aid to Salvador " New York Times February 2 1990 p 14
The murder of six Jesuit priests by government troops added fuel to the divisiveness of this 
situation Bush found justification in American policy when the Cristiani government arrested 
suspects in the murders
22 Andrew Rosenthal "Bush Claims role in Hostage Rescue in Salvador Hotel * New York Times November 
23 1989
23 Known as the Brady Plan (after Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady) the debt relief program became 
most significant as a part of U S foreign policy in the Post-Gulf War era The program will be 
examined more thoroughly when discussing the period following the cessation of hostilities For 
more information see Clyde H Farnsworth "Mexican-U S Pact Reached on Trade and Investments " 
New York Times October 4 1989 p 1 and "Trade Alternatives to Drugs New York Times
November 2 1989 p 16 and George Bush "President s News Conference on Foreign and Domestic 
Issues " August 16 1991 p 8 and Andrew Rosenthal "President Announces Plan for More Latin 
Debt Relief * New York Times June 28 1990 p 1
24 James Baker "Excerpts From Baker s Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee * New York
Times January 19 1989 p 8
25 Thomas L Friedman "Bush Said to Shift Cambodian Policy * New York Times July 7 1989 p 1
This shift took a full year to be completed For further information on criticisms from the 
Association of South East Asian Nations see Clifford Krauss "Baker Hints of Direct Contact with 
Phnom Penh * New York Times July 28 1990 p 5
26M  Thomas L Friedman "Gorbachev Accepts Deep Cuts in European Forces as Equal Baker Hints Shift on 
Germany " New York Times February 10 1990 p 6
6moving toward its construction While the Bush administration certified Pakistan in 1989 it was not without 
reservations 27
Bush pre-cnsis policy exhibited the major elements of post-crisis policy that really coalesced during the 
Persian Gulf Crisis Yet no particular policies were uniformly applied In one situation Bush called for 
compromise m the Middle East, while in another situation he had U S forces invade Panama. Furthermore 
while President Bush had received international support for the embargo of Panama, ex post facto appeals for 
support for the unilateral mvasion were not overly successful28 In essence as exhibited by these 
inconsistencies Bush had no vision on which to found American policy Yet sparked by the declining East 
West confrontation Bush soon saw the opportunity afforded the United States as the one remaining superpower 
to shape the world m its image This meant not only altering defense doctrines but strategizing to ensure the 
spread of democracy In the State of the Umon message on January 31 1990 President Bush saw the time not 
only for the spread of democratic freedoms but for the spread of free markets This process would be served 
through the strength and ability of American leadership to defend its own national interests 29 Thus the decline 
of the Cold War would allow Bush to unite many aspects of traditional American foreign policy into a vision of 
the future The initial test of Bush s vision would occur following the Iraqi mvasion of Kuwait Learning from 
the fallout after Panama, Bush began to build a foundation of legality before any action was taken
The W ar The Art of Rhetoric
The actual policy that arose out of the Gulf Crisis was not a departure from the earlier era What was a 
departure however was the foundation of a coherent strategy to carry out the mission in the Gulf The strategy 
differed greatly from that used in Panama because of the consistent application of a combination of openness 
international and United Nations participation and strict adherence to international law It is true that U S 
influence m the Middle East is not directly comparable to its influence in Latin America Yet what was 
significant about the strategy employed in the Gulf was the role that it played in shaping Bush s vision for the 
world and America s future As will be shown m the discussion of postwar policy this would be a universal 
not particular application of American foreign policy Yet George Bush s conception of universal” policy 
envisions employing American leadership to spread American ideals to the world In essence Bush envisions a 
Pax Americana (though he demes it) that combined with the decline of the Soviet Union permits the practice of 
a more unified and coherent U S foreign policy In order to show the evolutionary process of new” American 
foreign policy this section of the paper is organized chronologically
Initial statements from President Bush following the Iraqi mvasion of Kuwait were based on traditional 
pnnciples of American foreign policy and rested on four points (1) an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from 
Kuwait (2) the return of the legitimate Kuwaiti leadership (3) a longstanding commitment to security and 
stability m the Gulf and (4) the protection of American lives Realizing that any threat to oil also threatened 
American economic health Bush instituted sanctions against Iraq Yet, as compared with past practices certain 
differences arose Instead of a unilateral U S decision to send troops as was done in Panama or the hostage 
rescue m El Salvador the Saudi Arabian government requested” U S military assistance from Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney who had been dispatched to the Gulf soon after the crisis began Furthermore Bush saw 
this as an opportunity to exhibit the same stalwart” stand against Iraq as had led to victory” m the Cold War 
In essence Bush was trying to show to the world the continued willingness of the United States to stand against 
aggression and protect its friends 30
27 Stephen Engelberg "Talk to Pakistan Bush Urges India " New York Times July 9 1989 p 5 and 
Michael R Gordon "Nuclear Course set by Pakistan Worrying U S  " New York Times October 12 
1989 p 1 
oo
M Maureen Dowd "Bush Hardens Line on Noriega Ouster * New York Times May 14 1989 p 13
9Q"  George Bush "Transcript of Bush s State of the Union Message to the Union " New York Times 
February 1 1990 p 22
George Bush "Excerpts From Bush s Statement on U S Defense of Saudis " New York Times August 
9 1990 p 15 and George Bush "Excerpts From Statements By Bush on Strategy in Gulf * August 
12 1990 p 12
30
By August 15 Bush had recognized the benefits of a world role m the crisis though old habits of unilateral 
action were still being exhibited He called for the implementation of the U N resolutions condemnmg the Iraqi 
aggression while (as in Panama) justifying the U S initiation of a naval blockade of Iraq on an ex post facto 
appeal to international legality based on Amele 51 of the U N charter 31 While recognizing the importance of 
the crisis to help reestablish U S credibility by August 31 Bush explicitly raised the prospects for a new 
world order” to anse out of the cooperative spint engendered by the common defense of the region 32 Secretary 
of State James Baker was even more explicit than Bush He saw the post-Cold War world order standing at a 
critical juncture and the Iraqi invasion was a defining moment of a new era. Baker saw an opportunity to 
solidify the ground rules of the new era on the basis of the United Nations Additionally as Bush had before 
him Baker linked impediments to the flow of energy resources from the Middle East to the health of the global 
economy a particular threat to the viability of the struggling democracies of the world 33
In a clear example of post-Cold War relations Bush and then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev issued a 
jomt statement which called for the recognition of all U.N resolutions They also envisioned a post crisis 
world where the erstwhile enemies would work together to set up a regional security structure 3^ Finally on 
September 11 1990 President Bush explicitly added a fifth objective to the four objectives which had been stated 
at the outset of the crisis that of a New World Order ” With this announcement, Bush made a more 
systematic effort to define the substance of the order ” Building on the immediate principles of halting 
aggression and allowing the free flow of oil Bush saw the opportunity for the nations of the world to prosper m 
harmony under the umbrella of a United Nations free to carry out the roles envisioned for it by its founders He 
went on to predict that U S leadership would be an integral part of the new world partnership ” Furthermore 
the President believed that the Persian Gulf operation would restore American credibility by affirming that there 
is no substitute for American leadership against tyranny In keeping with this theme post ensis American 
leadership would have a lasting role m the security of the region through mediation security agreements and a 
curb on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 35
Speaking before the United Nations Bush reframed from appeals to patriotism and described his vision of 
the U.N s role m a post-crisis era. He optimistically predicted the continued spread of democracy and greater 
economic prosperity and peace which would be accompanied by a decime in the proliferation of weaponry 
Closer to home Bush envisioned the Americas as the first democratic hemisphere Bush predicted that, in 
addition to its response to the Iraqi mvasion the United Nations would expand its participation m environmental 
issues the limitation of terrorism the management of the debt burden policing the international drug trade and
31 George Bush "Excerpts of News Conference By Bush on Budget and Gulf " New York Times August 15 
1990 p 21 As for the invasion of Panama this action was justified on the basis of self- 
defense
32 George Bush "Excerpts From the President s News Conference on Gulf Crisis " New York Times 
August 31 1990 p 11
33 James Baker "Excerpts From Baker Testimony on U S and Gulf * New York Times September 5 1991
p 14 Baker referred to the nations of the Third World and Eastern Europe Later in 
justifying the participation of the United States to American citizens Baker claimed that 
dictatorial control of oil was a threat to American jobs Thomas L Friedman "U S Jobs at 
Stake in Gulf Baker Says " New York Times November 14 1990 p 14
34 "Text of Joint Statement Aggression Will Not Pay * New York Times September 10 1990 p 7
While not directly applicable to the Persian Gulf a year later the United States and the Soviet 
Union did join together to eliminate weapons shipments to the Afghan rebels and government by 
January 1 1992 While the United States sees this as a means to force elections on Afghan
President Najibullah it is likely that cutting foreign outlays was the prime motivator behind 
the post-coup Soviet agreement See Thomas L Friedman "U S and Soviets to End Arms Sales to 
Afghan Rivals " New York Tunes September 14 1991 p 1
35 George Bush "Transcript of President s Address to Joint Session of Congress " New York Times 
September 12 1991 p 20 For Iraq this was to include international guarantees to eliminate
their chemical weapons capabilities and halt the advance of research on nuclear weapons See 
"Bush Plan for Iraqi Arms " New York Times November 16 1990 p 12
aiding refugees as well as its traditional role of peace keeping In all Bush expected the U N to be an active 
force in future world politics 36
As the January 15 1991 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait approached Bush stressed the role of the 
United Nations Saddam is to comply with the United Nations resolution not a deadline of our own Armed 
Forces ” In addition to threats to world economic and human well being Bush feared the threat to the 
development of democracy in regions previously unaccustomed to democratic institutions For Bush high 
energy pnces posed a direct threat to the development of democracy m Eastern Europe In a somewhat 
contradictory fashion Bush stated *We are ready to use force to defend a new order emerging among nations of 
the world a world of sovereign nations living in peace At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit 37 
As the war began Bush envisioned a world where the rule of law not the jungle would govern the conduct of 
nations 38
Throughout the whole process however Bush s vision of multinational participation in a cooperative 
future of international relations was inconsistent with an evident attempt unilaterally to control the direction of 
events in the Persian Gulf While Secretary of State Baker claimed to welcome all diplomane efforts to solve 
the crisis peacefully rhetoric emanating from Washington seemed to preclude this possibility as early as August 
15 1990 3^ Furthermore the quick U S rejection of French and Soviet plans to solve the crisis without 
bloodshed undermined the validity of Baker s comments Finally while the meeting date proposed by Saddam 
Hussein of January 12 1991 just three days before the U N deadline raised certain logistical problems Bushs 
principled stand against meeting on that date could also be attributed to the desire to maintain the strong image 
projected by American leadership 40
The final prescription for the new world order really a summary of Bush s foreign policy development 
throughout the crisis was expressed on January 29 1991 m the State of the Union Address Bush described the 
universal aspirations of mankind, peace and security freedom and law These characteristics he claimed were 
being exhibited m the 28 nation coalition against Iraq Reverting to patriotism or what might be interpreted as 
Pax Americana rhetoric Bush said
For generations America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty And 
today m a rapidly changing world American leadership is indispensable
But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us We are Americans we have a unique 
responsibility to do the hard work for freedom And when we do freedom works
Yes the United States bears a major share of leadership in this effort [Gulf War] Among nations 
of the world only the United States of America has both the moral standing and the means to back it 
up We are the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace 41
A quick summary of the essence of Bush s vision for the world is in order before analyzing specific 
policies The President envisions a world that is ruled by law and rationality moving toward the freedoms of 
democracy—all to be under the supervision and guidance of the United States in areas of political economic and
^  George Bush "Transcript of President s Address to U N General Assembly * New York Times October 
2 1990 p 12
37 George Bush "Text of the Radio Address by the President " New York Times January 6 1991 p 14
38 George Bush "Transcript of the Comments by Bush on the Air Strikes Against the Iraqis " New York
Times January 17 1991 p 14
3^ James Baker "Remarks by Baker at News Conference in Geneva on Standoff in the Gulf * New York 
Times January 10 1991 p 14 For the earlier reference see George Bush "Excerpts of News 
Conference By Bush on Budget and Gulf " New York Times August 15 1990 p 21
^  George Bush "Excerpts From Bush s Remarks on Gulf Meetings " New York Times December 15 1990
p 8 While this statement is conjecture it becomes clearer in the post-crisis era that not 
only does U S foreign policy require that the United States be the dominant player in all areas 
of interest but that it be involved in as many regions and organizations as possible
4  ^George Bush "Transcript of President s State of the Union Message to Nation " New York Times 
January 30 1991 p 12
military affairs What has become apparent is that, while the United States will be heavily involved in this 
process Bush encourages the parucipauon of other nations particularly under the umbrella of international 
organizations like the United Nations To follow is a discussion of how this image of a new world is exhibited 
in contemporary American foreign policy
During the Crisis Evidence of Evolving Policy9
As would be expected foreign policy initiatives in other regions were minimal during the crisis From a 
strictly legalistic perspective the policy which was publicized was largely in keeping with Bush s rhetonc In 
promoting international cooperation Bush s initiatives were clearly exhibited m four instances First, a Gulf 
Crisis Financial Coordination Group was foimed to provide aid to those Third World countries hit hardest by the 
economic limitations on trade An important precursor of things to come was a proposal to forgive Egypt s 
huge debt42 Second the United States supported a U N  Security Council plan to form a governing council of 
the four competing factions m Cambodia 43 Subsequently this council and efforts to solve the Cambodian 
crisis were placed entirely under U N supervision To employ the U N  m this fashion m such a sensitive 
region could not have occurred during the Cold War Third, while following long term American policy Bush 
was required to suspend foreign aid to Pakistan because of its advancing nuclear program 44 Finally a definite 
example of Bush s economic rhetonc was found in the quick confirmation of most favored nation status for 
Mongolia.45
Interestingly two apparently contradictory episodes (one m Ime with Bush s rhetonc one not) occurred m 
Central Amenca The first involved the U S release of military aid to the Salvadoran government following the 
murder of two Amencan soldiers by rebel forces Instead of contnbuting to an escalation in the internal conflict, 
Bush decided to back a delay m dispersing the funds This would allow continued negotiations and permit 
legislative elections to be held two months later 46 The second episode involved a Bush administration request 
that the Soviets halt supplying minor military supplies to the Sandinista army The Chamorro government 
protested that such a policy could destabilize already tenuous relations between conservative and leftist forces 47 
The dichotomous nature of these two examples rests on the fact that one policy encouraged the legal process a 
process of achieving uniformity through negotiations and elections while the other subverts the internal policy 
of a sovereign state It is true that a U S request of the Soviets does not violate international law but it does 
violate the sovereignty of a state that the United States now supports In essence this second example 
exemplifies the Pax Americana policy—a United States employing technically legal means in order to mold the 
world according to its specifications
The Post War Era. Policy Coherence9
At the end of the Gulf War Amencan foreign policy makers faced a much different situation than the one that 
they had faced following the Panama invasion Whereas in Panama the Amencan focus of the attack had been 
the removal of General Manuel Nonega, the removal of Saddam Hussein had not been codified m the United
42 Clyde H Farnsworth "New Group to Direct Flow of Crisis Aid * New York Times September 26 1990
P 8
43 Reuters "US Opens Talks with Cambodian Communists * New York Times September 6 1990 p 7
44 Michael R Gordon "Nuclear Issue Slows U S Aid to Pakistan " New York Times October 1 1990 p
3 As part of an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act Bush was bound by law to suspend aid 
This process was not without some attempts by the State Department to waive the Act s 
applicability to this case In the end however aid was halted
45 Associated Press "Mongolia Gets U S Trade Aid " New York Times January 22 1991 p 7 One
could also argue that by quickly offering such trade status the United States is simply trying 
to neutralize any influence from both the Soviet Union and China Instead of being new policy 
it is old policy that has only recently become possible
46 Associated Press "Bush Backs but Delays Payment to El Salvador " New York Times January 17 
1991 p 5
47 Clifford Krauss "Managua Faults U S Bid to Soviets n New York Times March 2 1991 p 5
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Nations resolutions Realizing that the United States was commuted to following U.N guidelines Baker 
imitated the pie invasion policy in Panama by trying to pressure the Iraqis to overthrow Hussein through hints 
of lighter reparations 48 These hints contributed to the rebellions of Iraqi Shi ites and Kurds in the southern and 
northern portions of the country respectively The Kurdish situation became a problem for Bush While calling 
for Hussein s overthrow did not technically violate U.N resolutions the plight of the Kurds placed the United 
States m the moral dilemma of protecting the refugees without an official international sanction for U S forces 
to enter Iraqi territory In finally providing relief Baker used the pretext of Security Council Resolution 688 to 
protect the Kurdish people from genocide As this resolution did not explicitly sanction the unilateral action 
taken by Bush it was suggested by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar that United Nations troops be sent in 
place of American forces 49
Even with some inconsistencies U S  foreign policy exhibited a more unified direction In a speech shortly 
after the termination of the War Bush codified the American objectives for the Middle East (1) shared security 
arrangements with Arab nations (2) control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (3) a peace 
accord between the Arabs and Israelis and (4) the fostering of economic development m the region as a part of 
the peace process This last point was to be fulfilled through the redirection of military resources both in the 
region and in the United States
In recognizing a new world based on the principles of justice and fair play Bush reiterated the linkages 
between the decime of the Cold War and the enhanced position of the United Nations 50 This approach to 
foreign policy making demonstrated continuity with the process that had originally formed the United Nations 
coalition prior to the war In contrast to the approach in Panama, Bush policy had gamed greater coherence If 
nothing else this coherence came from clearly and openly stated objectives pnor to any acuon Additionally 
while past rhetonc was based on words with little substance for the most part Bush has followed the stated 
objectives In fact since the end of the war the four objectives in the Middle East have been genencally applied 
throughout the world.
In the area of security arrangements initial attempts for a permanent military base m Bahrain or weapons 
storage in Saudi Arabia have not succeeded Yet, new security pacts have been signed with Kuwait and Qatar 
while old security pacts with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were enhanced 51 Attempts to limit weapons 
proliferation are closely related to the security arrangements At first the United States commitment focused 
on destroying Iraqi capability m the areas of nuclear and chemical weapons This soon became a comprehensive 
plan for the entire Mideast that mvolved the members of the Security Council and eventually spread to the 
problem of arms sales to the Third World as a whole 52 Through further weapons sales however the United 
States raised some questions as to its commitment to arms control These sales were justified by Secretary of
48 Clifford Krauss "New U S Hint on Hussein * New York Times March 4 1991 p 8 The linkage
between Hussein s removal and the lifting of economic sanctions continues to exist
49 Steven Greenhouse "Baker Defends Refugee Plan at European Meeting * New York Times A p r il 8
1991 p 18 While concerned directly with the Kurds the text of the resolution makes no 
reference to sending troops It does recognize however the sovereign integrity of Iraq The 
only aspect of the article upon which the action could have been founded follows "6) A p p ea ls to 
all member states and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian 
relief efforts * Given this the legal foundation of the action was extremely weak U N 
Security Council 46th Session Resolutions New York 1991
George Bush "Transcript of President Bush s Address on End of the Gulf War " New York Times 
March 7 1991 p 8
^  Patrick E Tyler "Gulf Security Talks Stall Over Plan for Saudi Army " New York Times October 
13 1991 p 1 and Eric Schmitt "U S Negotiating New Security Pacts in Gulf " New York Times 
August 1 1991 p 6 Note aJ.so that while the United States reluctantly agreed to give up a 
military presence m  the Philippines it continues to support the NATO alliance and as recent 
events in Haiti have exhibited the 0 A S has become a more accepted means by which to enforce 
democratic change in the Western hemisphere
For discussion of this issue refer to the following sources "Bush Plan for Iraqi Arms " New 
York Times November 16 1991 p 12 and Andrew Rosenthal "Bush Unveils Plan for Arms Control 
in the Middle East " New York Times May 30 1991 p 1 and Alan Riding "Talks Begin on Arms 
Sales to Third World " New York Times July 9 1991 p 3
Defense Dick Cheney It is not inconsistent to say on the one hand we re interested in arms control and on 
the other hand we want to make certain our friends can defend themselves 53 Yet while the sale of American 
arms has grown there is an increased concern m the Bush administration about the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction as exemplified by U.N inspections in Iraq The issue of nuclear weapons development forms 
the backdrop for the U S denial of aid to Pakistan and greater vigilance m the cases of North Korea and Algeria.
The Mideast peace process is relatively simple to describe James Baker has spent substantial time 
mediating the disputes between Israel and the Arabs In essence he has tried to achieve a uniform base of 
compromise upon which to build the negotiations themselves As before this means prohibiting P L O 
participation m the conference because of Israeli opposition Concurrently Israel s request for $10 billion 
dollars m loan guarantees to fund settlement construe non was delayed because providing this money would be 
tantamount to tacit acceptance of a greater Israel In calling for a 120 day delay m considering the Israeli request, 
Bush was unwilling to upset the long balancing process upon which he felt the peace negotiations could 
begin 54
Direct U S participation in international diplomacy as exemplified by the Mideast peace conference is less 
prevalent than pnor to the end of the Cold War Now true to Bush s call for enhancing the diplomane role of 
international organizations the United Nations has recently produced breakthroughs m Cambodia and El 
Salvador Furthermore it is important to note that, as certain dictatorial abuses by President Jean Bertrand 
Aristide of Haiti came to light the Bush administration did not publicly contradict the O A S policy calling for 
his return 56 Yet, while working through international organizations to solve some situations Bush seems to 
believe that the United States is better at solving some of the more intractable problems Similar to the 
Mideast peace process Bush unsuccessfully tried to solve the Cyprus Crisis by the end of 1991 57
While President Bush failed to require postwar democratic reforms from the Kuwaiti Emir the driving forces 
behind his foreign policy are economic growth and the spread of democracy 58 In pushing for both Bush 
believes that economic progress as exemplified by free markets is the soil m which democracy grows best.
33 Eric Schmitt "Cheney Says U S Plans New Arms Sale to the Mideast " New York Times June 5 1991
p 3 Also The United States became the premier arms dealer to the Third World during 1990 
The jump was an astronomical 137% from $7 8 billion dollars m  1989 to $18 5 billion dollars in
1990 While much of the increase was due to the war the pre-war period during 1990 also
exhibited high sales Until we see the breakdown of the 1991 numbers it will be difficult to 
determine exactly which direction U S arms sales are going However given the excellent 
performance of American weaponry in the war and the relatively poor performance of Soviet weapons 
coupled to USSR/Russian decline as a superpower it would not be surprising to see sales continue 
at a high level This seems even more possible as Pentagon cutbacks force American arms 
producers to seek other markets See Robert Pear U S Ranked No 1 in Weapons Sales New York 
Times August 11 1991 p 10
54 George Bush "Excerpts From President Bush s News Session on Israeli Loan Guarantees " New York 
Times September 13 1991 p 10
33 Alan Riding *3 Cambodian Factions Sign a U N -enforced Peace Pact Khmer Rouge Shares Rule " New 
York Times October 24 1991 p 1 and Shirley Christian "Salvadoran Chief and Rebels Reach
Broad Agreement * New York Times September 28 1991
Thomas L Friedman "The White House Refuses to link Aristide Return and Democracy n New York 
Times October 8 1991 p 10 This came as private discussions seemed to indicate that American 
enthusiasm was not that great for Aristide s return While Bush s wartime rhetoric predicted 
current U S behavior toward Haiti to conclude that this is the sole issue is to forget Haiti s 
negligible economic importance to the United States 
57 Marlise Simons "Bush Hopes Are Dwindling for a Settlement m  Cyprus " New York Times October 10
1991 p 16 The Arab-Israeli negotiations may see greater U N participation following the
General Assembly s repeal (December 1991) of its 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism 
This resolution had been an obstacle to Israeli acceptance of an active U N role in the 
negotiations Ahmed Ñafie "Israel Remains a Fascist State " Al-Ahram W eekly January 2 1992
P 5
5ft Andrew Rosenthal Bush Not Pressing Kuwait on Reform New York Times April 3 1991 p i  To
not do so of course is a ma]or inconsistency between policy and rhetoric While Bush did 
suggest political reconstruction he claimed to be cautious because the war itself was fought 
over the question of one country s right to intervene in another
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While denying a Pax Americana President Bush proclaims the movement toward Pax Universalis [a process] 
built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations While the Pax Universalis appears to define the U S
policy on certain diplomatic levels it is in the area of economics that Bush is trying to mold the internal 
policies of Third World states
As an integral part m U S foreign economic policy the Brady Plan (originally introduced m March 1989) 
has been increasingly applied m international relations A multilateral approach to improving world economic 
conditions the plan s most important provision concerns the reduction of debt for Third World states Treasury 
Secretary Brady argued that the U S
should encourage debt and debt service reduction on a voluntary basis while recognizing the 
importance of continued new lending This should provide an important step back to the free markets 
where funds abound and transactions are enacted in days not months 60
The World Bank and I.M.F approved plan aimed to reduce the Thud World s $1 3 trillion dollar debt by 20% 
(about $350 billion dollars) over the three year period ending Spring 1992 61
Even in rewarding” Egypt for its role in the Gulf War debt forgiveness was contingent on economic 
reform 62 Furthermore the instrumental use of foreign aid/economic incentives is evident in other regions and 
appears to have become an integral part of current policy m Latin America and has even appeared m relations 
with Ethiopia.63 As a clear byproduct of the end of the Cold War United States policy makers no longer have 
to compete for influence m the Thud World This signifies that the U S can be direct in requiring that Thud 
World states desirous of aid comply with the free market and democratic reforms demanded by the Bush 
administration In essence such a non-competitive situation places the United States m an extremely strong 
position to use aid as an instrument to influence states in need Moreover Thud World states are m a weak 
position because to participate in the international system they must relinquish a certain degree of 
sovereignty 64
^  George Bush "Excerpts From Bush s Address to General Assembly For a Pax Universalis New 
York Times September 24 1991 p 14
6® Excerpts From Brady Remarks on Debt, New York Times,
March 11 1989 p 37
6* Clyde H Farnsworth "World Bank and I M F  Approve Plan to Cut Debt of Poorer Lands " New York 
Times April 9 1989 p 1 The plan was approved as partial reaction to Venezuelan debt riots
which lead to a significant number of fatalities The comments of Egyptians notwithstanding (see 
footnote #62) at this juncture it is difficult to judge the program s success
62 Clyde H Farnsworth "Egypt s Reward Forgiven Debt " New York Times April 10 1991 p D1
Approximately $10 billion dollars of debt was forgiven by the United States and its allies Of 
this amount approximately $7 billion dollars was held by the United States Furthermore from 
discussions with educated Egyptians during a December 1991 trip to the Middle East the general 
view of debt relief and economic reform is not one for optimism Those interviewed only saw this 
process as a further example of U S domination over Egypt One individual remarked that past 
aid has gone largely into the pockets of government officials instead of national development 
Predictions for the future were unchanged from the present
63 Clifford Krauss "Chamorro Wins Bush Promise on Debt " New York Times April 18 1991 A portion
of the Nicaraguan debt was officially forgiven in September 1991 Debt has also been forgiven 
for Chile and is being considered for Honduras The amounts are relatively small (all far less 
than $1 0 billion dollars) because the United States government only holds a small percentage of 
loans to Latin America the rest are held by private banks In Ethiopia the Bush administration 
has tied any provision of aid to human rights and institutional freedoms (such as the press)
See Jane Perlez "Ethiopian Factions Seek Broad Coalition " New York Times July 2 1991 p 9
64 An important issue here as Terry L Diebel and Michael Mandelbaum have pointed out is whether 
or not the American domestic economic situation is strong enough to sustain its foreign program 
If world diplomacy is shifting from military power to economic power the United States with 
such high budget and trade deficits cannot afford a long term process of aiding and guiding 
other states Nor will these states continue to respect United States influence if states such 
as Japan or Germany are better able to fulfill their needs Diebel "Bush s Foreign Policy 
Mastery and Inaction " and Mandelbaum "The Bush Foreign Policy " (see footnote 3 p 2)
In addition to bilateral relations the Bush administration is also pushing exisung and future alliances As 
in the case of NATO following the Cold War members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) have questioned the necessity of relying on the United States for security arrangements In a speech 
before the association Baker expressed fears that new regional security organizations will weaken exisung 
bilateral agreements between the United States and Southeast Asian states 65 Yet, as exhibited by earlier 
attempts to form regional trading blocs in the Pacific Basin and current attempts in Latin America, foreign 
policy makers are trying to avoid the erosion of American international influence by expanding its participation 
m international organizations 66 Though not a member of ASEAN Cold War politics allowed the United 
States to have significant influence on the association The formation of new organizations without U S 
participation threatens to undermine American attempts to insert its guiding hand in shapmg the world
As stated earlier Bush s foreign policy is no longer a haphazard collection of initiatives it is a vision of 
expanded American influence based on international legality and uniformity Bush s recent attempts to expand 
presidential powers m the allocation of foreign aid provides a broad overview of those objectives The five 
objectives are (1) the promotion of democratic values (2) strengthening Umted States competitiveness (3) 
promoting peace (4) protecting the Umted States from transnational threats and (5) meeting humanitarian 
needs In essence as discussed above Bush wants to use foreign aid as an instrument to ensure the achievement 
of American policy 67
Concluding Thoughts
While current U S foreign policy in the Third World exhibits a number of inconsistencies the process arising 
out of the Gulf War is more coherent than the process that came before In all current policy shows a general 
uniformity through the greater role of international legal norms compromise and international organizations as 
the means of policy achievement rather than the ends Part of the process includes aspects of idealism and self 
mierest which are expressed m the term Pax Americana The United States emerged from the war with restored 
credibility and world recognition that it was now the only true superpower The environmental change signifies 
greater policy latitude for the United States when dealing in the Third World and has been most notably 
exhibited in the instrumental use of foreign aid Additionally the Soviet decline gives American foreign policy 
a dominant position on the U N  Security Council (though China s role is unclear) Finally while the 
commitment to international legality has been strong part of the policy of Pax Americana is the tendency for 
the Bush Administration to justify policy on legal technicalities This was most obvious when the 
administration was justifying the Panama invasion and the institution of the Iraqi blockade as self defense 
measures While it was true that American nationals were still m these two countries this is likely to be the 
case in any world crisis To rely too heavily on the self defense” justification is to gradually undermine the 
foundations of international law
It may be too early to determine whether or not the policies of the American New World Order will play a 
long term role in international relations One of the primary considerations in predicting the future of Bush s 
policies are current economic problems in the American domestic economy Many have criticized Bush for 
devoting too much time and resources to foreign policy instead of solving problems at home Foreign aid is 
expensive and it is especially expensive when foreign debt is forgiven Not only does increasing the deficit 
auger poorly for the future strength of the American economy but it also signifies an increasing inability to
^  Philip Shenon "Baker Asks Asian to Move Wanly in New Pacts * New York Times July 25 1991 p
14
"Pacific Rim Initiative Seen " New York Times June 26 1989 Section IV p 9
^7 Janet Battaile "Bush Seeks Expanded Powers on Foreign Aid " New York Times April 14 1991 p 
14 Currently foreign aid is calculated through a congressional formula which decides the 
allocation of 90% of the funds Bush argued that governmental rules guiding the allocation of 
aid to countries such as the certification of Pakistan s nuclear program would still be followed 
Yet the president would have the prerogative instead of having requirements thrust upon him It 
is important to note that Bush has been able to wrestle certain aspects of control over foreign 
aid away from congress An example of this is Bush s acceding to a congressional freeze on aid 
to Jordan but being permitted to reserve the right to unfreeze the aid when deemed appropriate
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continue to provide foreign aid. If one of Bush s main goals was to restore Am encan credibility as the world 
leader the inability to provide continued aid coupled with a state supported by international banks will not 
instill international confidence about the leadership of the United States Furthermore while the Soviet Union 
is no longer a competitor m the Third World, the same cannot be said for Germany and Japan It seems likely 
that the Germans and the Japanese will be less concerned with the type of government and economy m Third 
World countries as long as these countries can provide a stable climate for investment. Thus in the long term 
it will be to the Third World s interest to focus relations on countries less demanding than the United States 68
Yet, if the Pax Americana portion of American foreign policy has a dubious future what are some long 
term positive factors that will anse out of the end of the Cold War'? It would appear that for whatever reason 
President Bush has been committed to legality and uniformity the rising role of international organizations 
should provide the structure to continue the development of these factors long after the current U S strategy is 
altered. Of course such a future is contingent on avoiding something cataclysmic (and given the possible 
ramifications of nuclear proliferation it is not unforseen) or the arrival of a new hegemon Out of this process 
it seems that the writings of Louis Hartz on the United States continue to be relevant Yet even as some 
factors in American foreign policy remain relatively unchanged, it is likely that certain positive aspects of the 
post Cold War policy exhibited in the ‘New World Order” will continue to be felt m the future
(A00 It is important to note as well that any attempts by Bush to shape the world will encounter
resistance from the varied cultural traditions in the Third World This has already occurred in 
the era of modernization especially notable in the Kennedy Administration Coupled with American 
economic problems cultural resistance to change will play a strong role in determining the 
success of American foreign policy
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